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After the subprime crisis it became clear that a stronger regulatory framework was crucial to ensure 
a healthy banking system. Changes in banks’ capital regulation and banking supervision standards 
have been the main focus of the policy discussions. The Fundamental Review of the Trading Book 
overhauls the market risk capital requirements, it aims to address shortcomings of the current Basel 
II.5 market risk capital framework and to increase the comparison of market risk weighted assets 
across banks in different jurisdictions. This dissertation seeks to assess the impact of the revised 
framework in the banking industry. 
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1. Background and rationale 
A strong and resilient banking system is the foundation for sustainable economic growth, as banks 
are the main intermediates in the credit process between savers and investors. Banking regulation 
originates from microeconomic concerns over the ability of bank creditors to monitor the risks 
originating on the lending side and from micro and macroeconomic concerns over the stability of 
the banking system in the case of a bank crisis. (Bonn, 2005) Since the first Basel accord, regulation 
has focused on capital, more capital should make banks more able to absorb losses with their own 
resources. Over the last years, regulatory capital requirements have been refined and broadened to 
cover various types of risks and to distinguish their treatment among different asset classes. In the 
process, the rules have become increasingly elaborate, reflecting the growing complexity of 
modern banking. (Demirgüç-Kunt, Detragiache and Merrouche, 2010) 
The Fundamental Review of the Trading Book (FRTB) sets the standards for minimum capital 
requirement regarding market risk. FRTB will be gradually implemented until 2019 and will 
overhaul a major part of the current regulation. (BIS, 2017a) As of today, FRTB has no legal 
meaning and Basel II.5 is the current framework for market risk. Due to The Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision (The Committee) decisions having an important impact on the financial 
institutions, this field becomes of interest. Especially FRTB, because amongst all the new incoming 
regulations, FRTB is expected to have one of the biggest impacts in the banking industry. Not only 
by increasing the capital requirements significantly but also by forcing banks to change their 
infrastructures. Furthermore, no previous regulation required banks to collect this wide-ranging 
type of data before. Thus, the required data and technology changes needed to comply with the 





2. Literature review 
According to the Bank of International Settlements (BIS, 2014a), The Committee already made 
some refinements to the proposed market risk framework. More specifically, on three specific 
areas: on the treatments of Internal Risk Transfers (IRT’s), on the Standardize Approach (SA) and 
on the concept of liquidity horizons. Regarding the treatment of IRT’s, there were several responses 
to the second consultative paper (BIS, 2012) requesting clarification on external hedges that were 
recognized in the capital framework as risk reliefs. The Committee acknowledged the merits of 
allowing banks to efficiently hedge risks in their banking books. For example, the better monitoring 
of counterparty risk limits and the improvement of the overall risk management of the bank. At the 
same time, IRT’s, if not properly constrained, can create incentives for capital arbitrage. The 
Committee is still developing a solution on this subject. Concerning the SA, the industry raised 
some concerns and The Committee agreed to a sensitivity-based approach as an alternative to the 
original cash flow-based calculations. This requires banks to use price and rate sensitivities that are 
more likely to be available in their systems as inputs already, reducing the implementation cost of 
this approach. Lastly, comments received on varying liquidity horizons pointed out potential 
implementation issues, such as the lack of comparability due to the complexity of the models and 
the fact that the approach provided small benefits in terms of precision compared with simplified 
modelling alternatives. The Committee adapted the framework according to the public comments. 
The first portfolio exercise (BIS, 2014b) focused on the revised Internal Models-based Approach 
(IMA) and comprised 41 banks from 13 countries. This exercise concluded that, although banks 
have raised numerous concerns about the implementation of the approach to liquidity horizons, the 
majority of banks were able to implement it. As expected, the move from the sum of VaR and 




there would be a 62% mean increase. Moreover, only a small proportion of banks were able to 
properly compute the capital charges for Non Modellable Risk Factors (NMRF). Concerning 
trading desks, most banks indicated that they expect to have less than 100 regulatory trading desks, 
and most of the risk appears to be concentrated in the largest 10% of desks.  Finally, on the stressed 
period selection, only six (out of 43) banks chose periods that did not include at least Q4 2008. 
McKinsey (McKinsey & Company, 2015) states that banks’ budgets for FRTB implementation 
range from $10 million to $20 million for medium-sized banks to $50 million to $100 million for 
large banks. Is expected that banks follow one of two potential strategic paths, depending on capital 
constraints and competitive dynamics. Capital-constrained banks, and those which lack 
competitive scale, will likely refocus their product portfolios. They will need to assess which 
products are core to their client base and, perhaps, exit from business lines which are not profitable. 
While banks that are less capital-constrained and operate at scale need to focus on where they can 
re-price to maintain profitability. This re-pricing will lead to some degree of volume reduction, 
particularly in more structured products where the capital charges are likely to be higher. 
Results from the first Quantitative Impact Study (QIS) (BIS, 2015), based on a sample of 44 banks, 
showed that compared to the current market risk framework, the proposed market risk framework 
would result in a weighted average increase of 74% in aggregate market risk capital charges. When 
measured as a simple average, this increase in the total market risk capital requirement is 41%. For 
the median bank in the same sample, the capital increase is 18%. Concerning the IMA, when 
measured as a simple average, the capital requirement is 54% higher. For the median bank, the 
capital requirement under the revised IMA is 13% higher. Compared to the current SA for market 
risk, the capital requirement is 128% higher, measured as a simple average. For the median bank, 





With the goal of assessing the impact of FRTB this dissertation uses figures concerning the 
Benchmarking Exercises made by The Committee.  
The Committee performs Quantitative Impact Studies (QIS) on a semi-annual basis with end-
December and end-June reporting dates. The figures used concern the results for the last quarter of 
2015 (2015Q4), second quarter of 2016 (2016Q2) and last quarter of 2016 (2016Q4). The 
participation in this exercise is voluntary and data is only reported on an aggregate basis, to 
guarantee the anonymity and confidentiality of the participating banks. To be part of the QIS all 
the banks are required to fill a template created by The Committee. The Committee then aggregates 
all the results using a weighted approach, hence the largest banks in the industry will have more 
impact in the final result than small banks.  
The figures, provided by BNP Paribas, show the impact of multiple components compared with 
the current methodologies. The figures are computed for the aggregated bank, weighted average, 
as well as a simple average. Some additional statistics are also available. Namely, the 25th 
Percentile, the Median and the 75th Percentile. The data provided, since December 2015 until 
December 2016, allows to analyse the way banks are adjusting to the new regulation and to observe 




4. Regulatory framework 
4.1. The need for a dynamic financial regulation 
The majority of people might think that the Subprime Crisis was caused by the lack of regulation 
and that the solution is to increase the regulatory framework. That would be an incorrect diagnosis. 
(ICMB and CEPR, 2009) By the time of 2008-2009 there were highly regulated institutions in 
regulated jurisdictions. Although in some cases there is, indeed, the need of an expansion in the 
regulatory framework, the solution is not as simple as an overall increase in regulation per se. What 
is required is a different type of regulation. A crisis should be used as a guide to what needs to be 
fixed, to discover what fundamental market failures were being ignored or improperly dealt with. 
Thus, the role of regulators should be to properly adapt the regulatory framework having in account 
the pace of the industry and paying close attention to gaps in the existing framework that frauds or 
financial distress situations may expose. 
The crisis that began in 2008 revealed that in a context in which financial products and transactions 
become more complex it is necessary to introduce new regulations and resolution mechanisms. 
The crisis showed the need to include in the legislation the goal of financial stability as well as the 
supervision of institutions that were likely to spread their issues to the entire financial system. 
Besides bringing severe discredit on all the financial authorities the global financial crisis brought 
awareness for the lack of control on banks and moral hazard issues. (CEPR and SRC, 2015) 
4.2. Regulatory entities 
The Bank for International Settlements (BIS) was created in 1929-1930 aiming to act as a banker 
for central banks, and to promote world-wide financial and monetary collaboration. The 
Committee, was established by the central bank Governors of the G10 countries at the end of 1974. 




supervision globally and promote financial stability by improving the quality of banking 
supervision worldwide. (BIS,2016a) Nowadays, The Committee, headquartered in Basel, is 
responsible for closing gaps in international supervisory coverage so that all banking 
establishments are subject to supervision. Furthermore, The Committee is responsible to guarantee 
that supervision is adequate and consistent across member jurisdictions.  
4.3.   Previous legislation 
4.3.1.  Basel I 
Basel I, also known as The Basel Capital Accord, was proposed in 1988. The 1988 Accord called 
for a minimum ratio of capital to risk-weighted assets of 8% to be implemented by the end of 1992 
and suffered several adjustments in the next years. (BIS, 2016a) When the Capital Accord was 
implemented the financial world was a simple place, with simple financial transactions, which can 
explain the simplicity of the regulation. And, although the regulation appeared to be a basic effort 
in terms of regulation, it did show improvements since banks had to improve their capital ratios to 
comply with the regulation. And more important, it introduced the concept of a standardized 
definition of capital adequacy globally and made awareness for the need of effective capital 
management in the financial industry. 
4.3.2    Basel II 
Basel II, also known as New Capital Framework, was released in June 2004 seeking to replace the 
1988 Capital Accord. This revised capital framework widened the focus on risk management and 
assessment by presenting a new approach, based on 3 pillars. Pillar 1, also known as Minimum 
Capital Requirements, stated that banks had to maintain a certain acceptable capital level. This 
approach has able to assess both Credit and Operational Risks. Pillar 2, known as Supervisory 




Furthermore, additional supervisory oversight was introduced regarding the way banks calculated 
their capital requirements, and regulators could intervene before the capital levels start to 
deteriorate. Pillar 3, regarding Market Discipline, enforced the levels of disclosure that the bank 
was subject to, aiming to strengthen market discipline and encourage good banking practices. (BIS, 
2005) 
        4.3.3   Basel II.5 
After the beginning of the crisis in 2008, The Committee felt the need to deal with the most present 
lacks in the existing regulation immediately. Thus, in July 2009 it introduced a set of revisions to 
the market risk framework, known as the Basel II.5.  
Major improvements from Basel II were, the deviation from VaR to SVaR approach and the 
attempt to capture credit and default risk by introducing the Incremental Risk Charge (IRC). Also, 
the introduction of a new measure, the Comprehensive Risk Measure (CRM), that assess the risks 
arising from the correlation between trading positions. And finally, a set of new charges for 
securitization positions. According to BIS an important property of Basel II.5, is the reduction of 
pro-cyclicality of the minimum capital requirement for market risk. (BIS, 2011) 
       4.3.4   Basel III 
Basel III can be considered the biggest regulatory change in the banking industry in the last years. 
Expected to be fully implemented until 2019, the new framework strengthens bank capital 
requirements and introduces new regulatory requirements on bank liquidity and leverage. (BIS, 
2017a) After the subprime crisis, The Committee admitted that the crisis had its roots on the 
excessive leverage and in the inadequate liquidity buffers. These two factors combined with poor 
risk management, as well as inappropriate incentive structures, resulted in the mispricing of credit 




The new standards were issued in December 2010 (BIS, 2010), strengthening the 3 pillars 
introduced by Basel II and widening the previous framework with multiple innovations. Namely, 
a capital conservation buffer, that consists in an additional layer of common equity; an additional 
countercyclical capital buffer, that restricts the participation of banks in system-wide credit booms; 
the introduction of a leverage ratio, a non-risk based measure, that states the minimum amount of 
capital that the bank is obligated to have relative to all its assets and off-balance sheet exposure; 
and two new measures for liquidity requirements, the Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) and The 
Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR). While the LCR intends to provide enough cash to meet the 
banks funding needs for short-term and long-term stressed periods, the NSFR intends to address 
the maturity mismatches present in the balance sheet. Additionally, The Committee created a 
proposal for systemically important banks (GSIBs) with supplementary capital requirements. 
          4.3.5    “Basel IV” 
While The Committee considers some latest reforms as the finalization of Basel III these new 
requirements are commonly referred to as “Basel IV”, which is the case of FRTB. FRTB belongs 
to the package of new standards issued by The Committee that is expected to overhaul most of the 
current regulatory framework, considered to be the biggest set of modifications in the history of 
banking regulation. 
As discussed, Basel III focused on the numerator of the minimum regulatory capital ratio by 
covering both the quantity and quality of banks’ capital. Now, “Basel IV”, aims to make changes 
in the denominator of that same ratio. Making banks to use either Standardize or Internal Models 
approaches when calculating their capital charges regarding credit, market and operational risk 
exposures. With this framework The Committee wants to revisit transparency and consistency in 




on the use of standardize approaches in the calculation of risk measures, in order to better compare 
banks’ risk exposures. It is expected a gradual implementation of “Basel IV” rules once the 
framework is finalized from 2022 until 2027, potential phase-in arrangements are still under 
discussion. (BIS, 2017b) 
Some examples of the new regulatory requirements that banks will be subject to under the “Basel 
IV” framework are the risk data aggregation and IT requirements (BCBS 239); the revised interest 
rate risk in the banking book standards (IRRBB); and the introduction of IFRS 9 accounting 
standards. Is worth mentioning that this new regulatory environment will require banks to run 
large-scale implementation programs. Moreover, additional capital requirements imposed by 
supervisors, such as during the EU Supervisory Review and Evaluation Process (SREP), will likely 
increase banks capital charges even further. (McKinsey & Company, 2017) 
4.4. Global Assessment 
The regulatory framework in place by the time of the crisis, Basel II, proved to be inadequate and 
made the situation even more disastrous, as its capital calculations for credit risk were procyclical. 
Meaning that in a situation of financial distress the probability of a counterparty defaulting and the 
loss in case of default both increase, causing the regulatory capital requirements to rise as well. 
This reveals a gap in Pillar 2, since this type of situation should be dealt with capital additional 
buffers, but by the time of the crisis risks had been underestimated. Pillar 2 states that under a 
review process, supervisors can evaluate whether banks should hold more capital than the Pillar 1 
minimum. In 2008 the minimum capital requirements under Pillar 1 were not sufficient to cover 
the losses caused by the default of most counterparties, and nor did the requirements under Pillar 
2, meaning that not only the banks but supervisors alike underestimate the risks taken. Pillar 3 




market also proved to be inefficient, as most of the linkages in the market were unpredictable and 
doubtful. Overall, Basel II can be blameworthy of requiring levels of capital that were inadequate 
and to delegate the assessment of credit risk to inappropriate institutions. Furthermore, the 
international framework assumed that the internal models used by banks, would result in higher 
requirements to those that supervisors could have implemented.  
After the crisis, The Committee, recognized the need to fix a certain number of structural flaws 
present in the previous framework, starting an overhaul of banking standards. Basel III framework, 
appears to solve some of the gaps in the legislation observed during the subprime crisis. While 
capital ratios are to be dramatically pushed forward, the introduction of capital buffers and liquidity 
ratios seems to address two of the major problems perceived in 2008. Without a doubt, the new 
framework makes it costlier for banks to have a riskier behaviour and to take unwanted risks. On 
the other hand, the package of additional requirements that follows Basel III, can have a 
considerable negative impact on the banking industry and be pointed out as quite complex. As it 
will overhauls all the current legislative framework, forcing banks to change their business models 
and infrastructures in order to adapt and be able to cope with all the new requirements. It can also 
be mentioned that Basel III impacts have not yet been analysed properly, since is only expected 
that the new framework is fully implemented in 2019. Thus the additional reforms do not have into 
account the pros and cons of Basel III framework. Although the implementation period of the 
additional requirement already suffered some changes, last one in December 2017 (BIS, 2017), the 
implementation period can be considered too short having in account the complexity of the revised 
framework. Taking into account that the new framework will overhaul most of the current 
legislation and will force banks to change their infrastructures and business strategies, a more 




5. FRTB implementation 
5.1.  Qualitative aspects 
5.1.1. Boundary between the Trading and Banking Book 
In October 2013, The Committee issued a revised regulatory boundary between the Trading Book 
(TB) and Banking Book (BB), aiming to reduce arbitrage of regulatory capital between the two 
books. Concerning the TB the regulatory framework states that, “instruments presumed to be in 
the TB are so designated because they are held with the intention of short-term resale; held with 
expectations of profiting from short-term price movements or arbitrage profits; and/or to hedge 
risks resulting from such instrument types.” (BIS, 2013) In this new regulatory boundary, the 
definition of the TB is supplemented with a list of instruments presumed to be in this book – the 
Presumption List. No deviation from this list is allowed without explicit approval, a bank must 
receive explicit supervisory approval to be able to do so. Under the revised boundary all TB 
instruments must be fair-valued daily, and any valuation changes must be recognized in the profit 
and loss (P&L) account. Banks must also document and disclose their policies for the assignment 
of instruments between books and make available such documentation to supervisors. Bank-
initiated decisions to switch instruments must be reported to the supervisor, receive approval, and 
be disclosed to the public. When an instrument is switched to another book, the bank will not be 
allowed to benefit from a lower regulatory capital requirement from this switch. If the capital 
charge on an instrument is reduced because of switching, the difference in charges is imposed on 
the bank as a fixed, as an additional Pillar 1 capital charge. (BIS, 2013) 
5.2. Quantitative aspects 
5.2.1 Internal Models Approach 
The use of an IMA will require explicit approval of the bank’s supervisory authority. The process 




Appendix 1. In the first step, the definition and structure of all trading desks is evaluated, as well 
as the bank’s organizational infrastructure and its internal risk capital model. The failure of this 
test means that the bank has to apply the SA in the entire TB. In the second step banks must 
nominate which trading desks are in-scope for model approval and which trading desks are out-of-
scope. Desks that are out-of-scope will have their capital charges calculated according to the SA. 
For the desks that the bank considers to be in-scope for the IMA model approval is required. Each 
trading desk must satisfy P&L attribution and back testing requirements on an ongoing basis. Step 
three is a risk factor analysis that will determine which risk factors are eligible to be used in the 
internal models. (BIS, 2013) 
The use of the IMA requires a model approval process, meaning that trading desks will have to 
show that their models are adequate, approval is based on a P&L Attribution and Back-testing tests. 
The P&L attribution test aims to assess whether the P&L based on risk factors included in the 
trading desk’s risk management model captures the material drivers of actual P&L. (BIS, 2013) 
The inputs of this test are the Hypothetical P&L and the Risk-based P&L, being the first one the 
daily desk-level P&L excluding the impact of new transactions and the second the model based 
P&L. The P&L Attribution requirements are based on two daily tests – Appendix 2 - that compare 
the unexplained P&L with the hypothetical P&L at a trading desk level. To succeed these tests a 
trading desk cannot have more than four breaches over the prior 12 months. 
Back-testing requirements seek to determine how well the risks are captured. The inputs for this 
assessment are the 1-day VaR (at 99% and 97.5%) and the Actual P&L. The test is based on the 
comparison of the VaR measures with the actual P&L outcomes. The back-testing assessment will 




than a maximum number of breaches over the prior 12 months, in case of VaR at 97.5% this number 
is 30 breaches, and for VaR at 99% the value is 12 breaches. 
Under this new framework it is important to distinguish between modellable and non-modellable 
risk factors. For a risk factor to be classified as modellable by a bank there must be continuously 
available “real prices” for a sufficient set of representative transactions. “Real price” is defined as 
a price (i) at which the institution has conducted a transaction; (ii) that is verifiable for an actual 
transaction between other arms-length parties; (iii) or that is obtained from a committed quote. 
Additionally, if the price is obtained from a third-party, the transaction has to be processed through 
that party and the party must agree to provide evidence of the transaction to supervisors upon 
request. Also, an additional requirement needs to be fulfilled: a risk factor must have at least 24 
observations per year, with a maximum period of one month between two consecutive 
observations. The previous criteria must be assessed monthly. (BIS, 2013) 
Risk factors that do not meet these conditions are deemed to be non-modellable and must be 
capitalized individually using a separate stressed capital add-on. Modellable risk factors are 
capitalized under the Expected Shortfall (ES), ES must be computed daily at a bank and trading 
desk level, with a 97.5th percentile. ES loss distribution must also have into account the liquidity 
characteristics of the risk factor. Liquidity horizon is defined as “the time required to exit or hedge 
a risk position without materially affecting market prices in stressed market conditions”. (BIS, 
2016b) The ES measure must be calibrated to the most severe 12-month period of stress available 
over the observation horizon, Stressed ES (sES). The revised approach uses a supervisory 
aggregation scheme to restrict correlations across risk factor categories and hedging benefits. 
Hence, the final ES figure is calculated as an equal-weighted average of an “unconstrained” bank-




“constrained” partial ES charges, for asset class, with no cross-risk class diversification benefit 
recognized. NMRF are capitalized individually using a stress scenario that is calibrated to be at 
least as conservative as the ES calibration used for the bank’s internal model. The final value is 
calculated by the sum of all stand-alone charges without any diversification benefits. 
Furthermore, the revised framework replaces the IRC with a Default Risk Charge (DRC) measure. 
Default risk is the risk of direct loss due to an obligor’s default as well as indirect losses that may 
arise from a default event. The DRC model will capture default risk exclusively and also limit the 
types of risk factors and correlations that can be used within the model. This default risk is 
measured using a VaR model, at a 1-year time horizon and 99.9% confidence interval.  
The total charge for market risk under the IMA will be equal to the capital requirements for eligible 
trading desks, both modellable risk factors and NMRF, plus the Default Risk charge plus the 
standardized capital charge for ineligible trading desks. 
5.2.2  Standardized Approach 
The new SA has three main objectives. First, the approach must fit banks with a level of trading 
activity that do not require sophisticated measurement of market risk. Second, it has to provide a 
fall back if a bank fails to be apt to use the IMA. Finally, the approach should facilitate consistency 
and comparability on the reporting of market risk across banks and jurisdictions. The revised SA 
will also capture the risks from securitization exposures in the TB, which are fully removed from 
the IMA for market risk. This approach must be calculated by all banks and reported to their 
supervisor monthly, even if a bank is authorized to use the IMA.  
The major change is that the approach is now based on risk sensitivities across asset classes: there 




then be mapped to. The underlying principle for bucketing was to group instruments deemed to be 
sufficiently homogenous from a risk perspective. (BIS, 2013) To make a link between the SA and 
IMA some improvements from the IMA were embedded into the revised SA. Namely, the “bucket” 
risk weights within each risk class under the SA have been calibrated to stressed market conditions 
using an ES methodology. The concept of varying liquidity horizons is used as well in the 
calibration of the standardized risk weights. The SA capital requirement is the sum of three 
components: the risk charges under the Sensitivities based method (SBM), the DRC, and the 
residual risk add-on (RRAO).  
The risk charge under the SBM must be calculated by aggregating three risk sensitivities: “delta”, 
“vega” and “curvature”. Instruments are mapped to a set of regulatory prescribed risk factors to 
which shocks are applied to calculate a capital charge for the individual risk factors. Then, the risk-
weighted sensitivities are aggregated within each bucket, using regulator-prescribed aggregation 
formula and correlations. The total capital charge is the sum of each risk-class level capital charge. 
This method is calculated for three different correlation scenarios (medium, low and high), the final 
capital charge is the maximum of the overall scenario capital charge. (BIS, 2015b) 
The DRC captures the jump-to-default risk, using the same calculation method as the IMA. The 
standardized DRC allows for some limited hedging recognition within each bucket category, but 
not across different bucket categories.  
A residual risk add-on is introduced to ensure sufficient coverage of all market risks. It provides a 
simple and conservative capital treatment for more complex instruments. The RRAO is the sum of 
gross notional amounts of the instruments bearing residual risks, multiplied by a risk weight factor 




6. Data and empirical results 
Using data from 2015Q4, 2016Q2 and 2016Q4 - Appendix: Graph 1. -, FRTB represents an 
increase of 51%, 64% and 47%, respectively, when compared to the current framework and 
computed as a weighted average. If considering a simple average this value is higher than the 
previous one: 52%, 94% and 57% for 2015Q4, 2016Q2 and 2016Q4, respectively. By analysing 
the 25th percentile one can see that even banks in this part of the distribution registered an increase 
in capital charges of 18% in the last quarter of 2016. The values concerning the 75th percentile can 
be quite worrisome, showing that some banks registered an increase around 200% on their current 
capital charges. The previous figures were computed having in account both the desks falling under 
IMA and under the SA. To better understand both approaches and what components have a bigger 
impact one has to take a closer look to each approach on a stand-alone basis. 
When comparing the SA with the current total capital charge, only for non-securitisations - 
Appendix: Graph 2. -, in the last quarter of 2016, is possible to observe that the revised approach 
represents a 159% increase, computed as a simple average and a 146% increase if computed as 
weighted average. Under this new approach the median bank registered a 151% increase in its 
capital charges. Banks in the 25th percentile registered a 94% increase in their charges. Looking at 
the 75th percentile, having all the desks under SA, would mean an increase of 192% in the capital 
costs. Breaking down the components of the SA - Appendix: Graph 3. -, using data from 2015Q4 
and 2016Q2, is possible to observe that the SBM component has by far the biggest impact. Looking 
closer on SBM statistics for 2016Q2, for the aggregated bank this component represents 70% of 
the SA, is also possible to observe that the aggregated bank is in 25th percentile. Analysing the 
banks standing on the 75th percentile, these institutions registered 85% of their capital charges 




Although with a smaller impact than the SA, observing 2016Q4 results for the - Appendix: Graph 
4. -, is possible to observe that FRTB represent as 48% increase compared with the current IMA, 
for the aggregated bank. When computed as a simple average the increase is 55% and 46% for the 
median bank. Banks standing in the 25th percentile saw their capital charges increased by 3%, while 
banks in the 75th percentile had an increase of 111%. Breaking down IMA components - Appendix: 
Graph 5. -, since 2015Q4 until 2016Q4, all components seem to be balanced and none of them has 
a major impact as seen previously with SBM under the SA.  
When comparing both approaches - Appendix: Graph 6. -, using 2016Q4 data, SA represents an 
increase of 128% in capital charges compared to the IMA, considering the aggregated bank. If the 
analysis does not include residuals components (RRAO and NMRF) this value stands for 179%. 
Showing that NMRF under IMA has a higher impact than RRAO on SA. As seen before, SBM 
under SA is the component that creates a bigger increase and ES under IMA is likely to create an 
increase as well for the majority of banks. The last component to be compared is the DRC under 
both approaches, using data only for modellable desks, the DRC under SA represents a 127% 
additional capital charge compared with the DRC under IMA. Using 2014Q4 data, comparing the 
new DRC measure with the previous IRC - Appendix: Graph 7. -, under the IMA is possible to 
observe that the aggregated bank registered an increase of 164%, which can be explained, in part, 
by the new requirement for equity default risk to be under this component. When comparing the 
DRC under SA with the IRC, the aggregated bank registered a 40% decrease, this value can be 
explained by the fact that it does not consider securitisations impact. Under FRTB, securitisations 
will always be computed under the SA. Taking a closer look on securitisations components - 
Appendix: Graph 8. -, using data from 2016Q2, is possible to see that the major impact for 




7. Impacts and future research 
The implementation of FRTB represents a major challenge for the banking industry in several 
areas. Namely, the need for increasing technological skills and computational power, the 
strengthening of the existing market risk infrastructure and the planning of changes in the business 
strategy and overall infrastructure. Banks also need to prepare to adjust their risk calculations and 
data sourcing to be able to run their models at desk level and to adhere to a desk structure that 
complies with the rules the regulatory have set, adjusting their strategies accordingly. Setting a 
clear strategic path to implement FRTB will be a big challenge. In terms of costs, banks can expect 
not only significant increases in market risk capital charges but also increases in their business-as-
usual costs due to the new computation requirements. Thus, banks will need to assign a 
considerable sizeable budget to be able to deal with the revised framework. The implementation of 
FRTB will also require a clear understanding of the regulation and its impact. Banks will also have 
an increase in costs due to hiring new people and giving additional training to their current staff to 
deliver the complex program of work that supervisors are expecting. 
The major problems for banks will arise from data management, data sourcing and operational 
issues. There are some quantitative challenges when implementing FRTB, which are 
fundamentally a data challenge. First, banks need to understand the incremental data requirements 
compared with the existing data calculation models. Compared with previous regulatory 
frameworks banks will need to manage a lot more data, and the rules for the calculations are a lot 
more prescriptive. Under FRTB there will be much more data to be produced, while in the current 
frameworks banks aggregate data at a higher level, at bank level, the new framework requires data 
do be aggregated at a trade desk level. Other issue for banks will arise from the restrictions 




good data source for risk models, which will be particularly challenging in the case of complex 
derivative products where the bank might not have enough data and market data sources lack as 
well.  
Specifically under the IMA, the revised framework will impose a greater computational burden, 
some examples are the management of historical market data, calibration of stress periods and 
scenario generation across multiple trading desks. Banks need to gather data at raw level, clean the 
information, compute it and aggregate the results to present to their regulator. It will force banks 
to completely change the way they gather and organize data. P&L Attribution tests also represent 
a significant challenge, as they will require the finance and risk functions to become more align. 
Although this can vary from bank to bank, in most institutions there is a gap between these two 
departments.  
Besides FRTB, in the next years banks will also be subject to additional regulatory requirements 
under the “Basel IV” framework. What is common between all these new frameworks is that they 
all require banks to deal with increasingly detailed data. It would be interesting to further explore 
what changes in the current technological systems and perhaps what new systems banks can use to 
be able to manage the new amount of data. Also, what type of advantages can banks that are leading 
the technology field and are more innovative in technology solutions can have when adapting to 
new regulation. Additionally, how are new requirements for more and more detailed data affecting 
banks in terms of becoming more inventive and aware of new solutions, embracing a more 
technological mind-set. Furthermore, it would be useful to study synergies between regulations, 
like Markets in Financial Instruments Directive II (MiFID II), that require banks to declare data 
regarding prices, which may be helpful in the treatment of the NMRF, a component that showed 




8. Conclusions  
In order to assess the impact of the revised framework to measure market risk this dissertation 
started by analysing previous regulatory frameworks, concluding that although the new framework 
is able to solve most of the lacks in the previous legislation, it appears to be a lot more complex 
than the ones presented before. To show the complexity of the implementation, the major 
challenges of the process were presented, both for the qualitative and quantitative aspects of the 
new framework. When analysing the previous QIS figures it is possible to conclude that FRTB will 
likely have an impact of 50% increase in the banking industry. Also, by looking at the difference 
between the weighted average and the simple average is possible to observe that, in relative terms, 
small banks will be more impacted than bigger banks when comparing the total charges under 
FRTB with their current capital charges. Although, on the other hand, big banks will have more 
costs implementing the new framework, since they require more sophisticated approaches 
concerning data management. Also, the difference is probably arising from the fact that bigger 
banks have already higher capital charges than small banks. 
Under the SA the component that creates more capital charges is the SBM, also one of the 
components that arises more issues in terms of data management, computation and production of 
figures. Is also worth mentioning that even if a bank is allowed to use the IMA for some of its desks 
the SA capital charges figures have to be deliver to the regulator as well.  
Under the IMA all components seem to be balanced. However, this approach requires the approval 
of the P&L Attribution and Back-testing tests, also a significant challenge. The P&L Attribution 
test will require the Finance and Risk department to work more closely with each other. The 
approval in the P&L test depends on the similarity between the Unexpected P&L and the 




desk to be able to have its capital charges calculated under the IMA these two functions will have 
to become more align in terms of data models. Other issue under the IMA is the requirements for 
a risk factor to be considered modellable. If a risk factor is considerable a NMRF, in case there is 
no data concerning the price, that will represent an increase in the capital charge, compared with 
the computation of ES and sES. Thus, the availability of public data is a matter of concerning, 
mostly on complex derivatives products. If a desk trades a specific asset class or product that has 
a cyclical nature, that desk might be more profitable under the SA even if its apt to fall under the 
IMA. Because if a product is only traded in specific times, there will be lack of pricing data for 
more than one month apart, hence the instrument will be considered as a NMRF registering a higher 
capital charge. For products traded in the US there is data for prices available in the central 
reporting depository, the Trade Reporting and Compliance Engine. For Europe, MiFID II, to be 
implemented in January 2018, will require banks to disclose and make available more data on 
prices. Concerning APAC, there is few public data available and there is no reporting depository 
nor legislation that appears to minimize the probability of a product to be considered as NMRF.  
Since the bank has to declare its SA charges to the regulators under any circumstances, at a certain 
point, if the computation process becomes too complex and it is not possible for the bank to produce 
such amount of data in the required timeframes, the bank can, purposely, have some of its desks 
that would be allowed to use the IMA under the SA. The same can happen if the bank happens to 
have most of its desks under the SA and the marginal increment in the capital charge under SA is 
lower than the capital charge under IMA, having in account all the additional calculations. 
The function of the Resources Management team is then to evaluate not only the impact of the 
future regulation but as well analyse all the possible outcomes and ways to minimize the final 
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Graph 6. IMA vs SA                               Graph 7. DRC vs IRC       
















Graph 8. Securitisations 
 
 
      
 
 
 
 
 
 
